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What do Cadbury, Toblerone and Kit-Kat chocolates, the Rubik’s Cube and Lego
mini-figurine toys, Louboutin shoes, Bottega Veneta bags and London Taxi
Company cabs all have in common? These products have been, along with several
others, protagonists of the rising trend of registering shapes and other nontraditional trademarks in a variety of countries, and then, in several cases,
protagonist of ensuing litigation addressing the validity of these marks. To a large
extent, the review panels and the courts involved in these cases have declared
several of these marks invalid or have reduced their scope considerably. Hence,
these cases have often involved several degrees of litigation and have been heralded
in the news. In some instances, the courts have also upheld the validity of nontraditional marks and the possibility to register these signs, for example, with
respect to the registrability of the décor of the Apple Store.
It is no secret that the domain of trademark law and the scope of trademark
protection has grown exponentially in the past decades. Today, any sign can be
registered as a mark. This includes single colors, shapes, sounds, smells, video clips,
holograms and even gestures. The very broad definition of trademarks in the 1994
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
confirmed the possibility to protect all these types of marks, commonly referred to
as non-conventional or non-traditional marks, on a worldwide scale. Moreover,
TRIPS only permits, but does not mandate, that members provide that signs should
be ‘‘visually perceptible’’ to be protected as marks. The adoption of the Trademark
Law Treaty and the Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks in the following
years further facilitated the registrability of these signs. Recent bilateral and
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plurilateral international trade agreements have continued on the same path. As a
result, a wide variety of non-traditional marks have been registered in many
countries and in the European Union. A search through national registries reveals a
long list of these marks, particularly shapes and colors, including combinations of or
even single colors.
However, this expansion of the scope of trademark protection has been
accompanied only by a partial expansion of the grounds for denying these
registrations or the creation of defenses to permit relevant uses of these or similar
signs in the interest of competition or other non-commercial uses. For example,
TRIPS only allows, but again does not mandate, that members adopt limitations and
exceptions to trademark rights. Hence, the expansion of protection to non-traditional
marks can have serious effects on market competition as these signs often protect
products or parts of products, per se. Likewise, the protection of these signs can
prevent other socially valuable uses of these or similar signs in related or unrelated
non-commercial contexts. The potential harm that the protection of these signs can
entail for market competition as well as cultural and artistic freedom is even more
dramatic when one considers that the protection granted to trademarks may last in
perpetuity. For the signs that acquire the status of well-known or famous marks, or
simply for marks that have a reputation (in the EU and countries that use a similar
wording in their laws), this protection additionally extends to non-similar goods and
services.
Several courts across the world seem to share these concerns. As mentioned
above, several courts have invalidated some prominent non-traditional marks in
recent years. Hence, as lawyers and academics know too well, the cases that are
litigated are just a small fraction of the claims that are brought (at times arbitrarily)
by trademark owners. Most of these claims settle in secret, and often involve
licensing or co-existence agreements, or simply the acceptance by third parties not
to use the non-traditional mark in the future. Only defendants with ‘‘deep pockets’’
can afford expensive and lengthy litigation (such as Yves Saint Laurent, Cadbury,
Nestle, etc.), thus the potential chilling effects of protecting non-traditional marks
on both market competition and freedom of expression are difficult to quantify in
practice. Even though prominent marks have been cancelled, many are still
registered and only a handful of applications seem to get the necessary extra
scrutiny that may be required by the trademark examiners or the review panels in
charge of oppositions or cancellations before the registration of these marks.

1 How Did We Get Here?
The reason for the rise of non-traditional trademarks lies at the heart of the
requirement for trademark protection – the notion of distinctiveness. In particular,
rather than continuing to represent a requirement necessary for a mark to identify
goods or services in the marketplace, distinctiveness has come to mean little more
than ‘‘recognizable’’ by the human senses when it is applied by trademark
examiners to the distinctive features of the signs that are applied to be protected as
marks. In particular, signs only need to be ‘‘capable of distinguishing’’ commercial
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source under most legal definitions today. Also in countries, such as the United
States, that require secondary meaning to register some of these signs, the bar to
prove distinctiveness is very low. In other words, the current system has become
circular, so that any distinctive sign, including products or product features, can be
potentially protected as a mark. This includes the shape of Kit-Kat or Toblerone
chocolates, the shape of Lego figurines, the Rubik’s Cube, the sole of Louboutin
shoes, the shape of Bottega Veneta bags and of the London taxi cabs – which are all
very distinctive design features of the products (if not the overall products), but
which were certainly never meant to be marks in the traditional sense, but rather
constitute designs or creative works and as such deserve protection as designs or
copyrights.
This circularity between the notion of distinctiveness and trademark-protectable subject matter is coupled with a weak system both in terms of absolute
grounds to refuse trademark registration as well as trademark defenses across many
jurisdictions. For example, historically, shape marks could not be registered at all in
several countries, including the United Kingdom and Germany. These prohibitions
are long gone and have been replaced, in several countries, with a list of absolute
grounds that prevent trademark registration. These include exclusion from
registration of signs that are ‘‘functional’’ in the U.S. Lanham Act and ‘‘aesthetically
functional’’ under U.S. case law, or signs that comprise of the ‘‘shape, or another
characteristic’’ of a product that either ‘‘results from the nature of the goods’’ or ‘‘is
necessary to obtain a technical result’’ or ‘‘gives substantial value to the goods’’ in
the EU. In fairness, courts have increasingly resorted to these provisions to deny
protection to non-traditional trademarks. Hence, again, these cases are only the tip
of the iceberg of potentially many more cases that are settled. Moreover, no sound
defenses have been crafted, to date, to limit the use, and potential abuses, of nontraditional trademarks. For example, the defense based on the right to use a mark
descriptively remains hard to invoke in these contexts, and the judicial doctrine of
aesthetic functionality remains primarily a U.S.-based doctrine and has been applied
inconsistently to date.

2 What Could Be Done?
In concluding, I would like to suggest that more attention has to be paid to the
process of registration of non-traditional trademarks, particularly for the signs that
could also be protected (or are protected) as industrial designs or design patents. As
I have mentioned, the current definition of trademarks has led to a slippery slope
situation where anything that is capable of distinguishing, because it is either
original or interesting to the eye (and well-advertised), can be registered as a mark.
Accordingly, trademark examiners should require a higher degree of secondary
meaning before registering these marks. They should also strictly enforce the
existing absolute grounds and scrutinize further whether these signs may fall under
these prohibitions. During the recent wave of litigation, it has become apparent that
several signs that were opposed and contested at the time of application were still
registered by trademark offices, only to be denied protection later when the judiciary
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intervened in these disputes. Trademark examiners and trademark offices should
(and probably already do) take these decisions as new guidelines to enforce stricter
standards when examining the applications to register non-traditional marks.
Moreover, the courts could go further and use the actual drawings in every
trademark registration, as it has been registered, to define the scope of trademark
infringement, particularly the similarity of the registered marks and potentially
infringing signs. For example, the Lego mini-figurine is registered as a simple shape
figurine, without any ornaments, hair or hats. Should competitors make a specific
type of figurine that is similar to the Lego figurines, but a character that is different
from any existing Lego figurine, courts should rely on the Lego figurine mark, as
registered, in the instance of a claim of infringement, to assess similarity and in turn
a likelihood of confusion. In addition, the courts should continue to enforce the
existing limitations and declare the registration of these marks invalid anytime these
registrations should not have been granted due to the existence of an absolute
ground for refusal of registration. In particular, courts should scrutinize strictly
whether these marks are shapes and other characteristics that give value to the goods
per se and cancel the marks when these conditions arise. This may often be the case,
as these marks frequently do give value to the goods beyond their trademark
distinctive function, as these marks often are the goods, or parts of them.
Ultimately, the proliferation of non-traditional trademark registrations, applications, and the recent wave of litigation in this area, is symptomatic of the larger
disease of ‘‘intellectual property protection grabbing’’. Non-traditional trademarks
protect products and features that, as I have mentioned, usually constitute product
design or could perhaps be protected under copyright. Not surprisingly, some of the
most heralded lawsuits in the area involve companies trying to prolong their
exclusive rights in a valuable product through trademark protection, as trademarks
grant a low-cost, low-barrier entry to protection with potentially high rewards. Yet,
should this situation be allowed to continue? As increasingly noted by the courts,
this trend can lead to abuses. Trademark rights are supposed to be granted to signs
that are needed to distinguish products in the marketplace, not to every possibly
distinctive sign. Thus, no matter the pressure from trademark owners and their
lawyers, trademark examiners, trademark offices and the courts should (continue to)
restore appropriate limitations to the registration and enforcement of these marks.
This is crucial to safeguard market competition and freedom of culture and
expression, and ultimately to prevent more abuses to the trademark system.
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